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 Projecting Power Overseas: U.S. Postal 
Policy and International Standard-Setting 
at the 1863 Paris Postal Conference 
 In May 1863, representatives from the fi ft een countries that generated 95 percent 
of the world’s correspondence met in Paris to devise a set of common stan-
dards for international postal communications.  1  Th e impetus for this meeting, 
which would become known as the Paris Postal Conference, originated not in 
France, nor in Great Britain, nor even in Prussia.  2  Rather, it was the brainchild 
of a little-known U.S. postal administrator-turned-lawmaker, John A. Kasson. 
In the previous year, Kasson had persuaded the U.S. postmaster general, 
Montgomery Blair, to recruit the U.S. secretary of state William Seward to 
convene an international meeting on postal standard-setting. Originally, 
Kasson assumed that this meeting would be convened in Brussels, Belgium, a 
logical site, since Brussels had hosted many international forums, including a 
statistical congress that had briefl y discussed international postal reform in 
1853.  3  Yet this was not to be. At the request of the U.S. State Department, and 
presumably to mollify the French government, since France’s geographical 
position gave it a central role in any international negotiation involving trans-
national postal rates, Kasson agreed in December 1862 to shift  the venue from 
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Brussels to Paris.  4  Having secured the appointment as the U.S. delegate, Kasson 
set out in Paris to realize the vision that had inspired his original call. 
 Kasson’s engagement with international aff airs built on his long-standing 
commitment to progressive politics. Over a dozen years earlier, in 1848, 
Kasson had been a delegate to the third-party “Free Soil” party convention 
that had barred slavery in the western territories owned by the United States. 
In 1860, Kasson had introduced a similar plank in the Republican Party 
platform. Th e “normal condition” of the territories, Kasson’s plank declared, 
“was freedom.”  5  International postal reform provided Kasson with yet another 
opportunity to reenvision political boundaries to promote a cherished civic ideal. 
 Kasson never intimated in print that the Paris Postal Conference had 
anything to do with the titanic contest that was concurrently being waged 
in the United States between the Union and the Confederacy. In fact, the 
confl ict went entirely unmentioned in the offi  cial transcript of the confer-
ence proceedings. Th is absence spoke volumes. Th e pivotal role of the U.S. 
government in organizing the conference serves as a reminder of how, even 
in the midst of a devastating civil war, Union administrators found it expedient 
to look not only westward toward the trans-Mississippi west, and southward 
toward the rebellious states of the Confederacy, but also eastward toward 
Europe. While Kasson kept the Civil War out of the proceedings, as a high-
ranking Union offi  cial, it could not have been far from his mind. By articu-
lating an expansive civic rationale for postal communications, he contrasted 
the United States not only with the European great powers but also with the 
Confederacy. In so doing, he invented a novel way for the United States to 
project its power overseas. 
 Th e Paris Postal Conference typically receives at best a brief mention in 
the principal histories of nineteenth-century international organizations.  6  
Most of these accounts emphasize its limited ambit. Though the delegates 
agreed on thirty-one different protocols to facilitate future bilateral postal 
treaties, they neither altered existing postal regulations nor established a 
permanent standard-setting body. Typically, the conference is treated less as 
an event in its own right than as a precursor to the establishment of the General 
Postal Union (GPU) in 1874. Th e GPU, which would be renamed the Universal 
Postal Union (or UPU) in 1878, remains today the principal standard-setting 
body in international postal communications. 
 Th e GPU is oft en described as emerging more or less organically out of a 
series of international postal treaties, dating back to the 1850s, that the Austrian 
government had ratifi ed with various German states.  7  Predictably enough, 
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given this genealogy, the UPU is regarded as a German legacy, and, in partic-
ular, the brainchild of the enterprising Prussian postal administrator Heinrich 
von Stephan. In fact, Prussia played at best a supporting role in 1863. Far more 
important was the United States, in large part because of its distinctive civic 
rationale for communications, that is, the presumption that access to infor-
mation was a public good that governments had an obligation to facilitate 
more or less without regard for its cost. 
 Th e signifi cance of the Paris Postal Conference for the history of U.S. 
international relations has largely gone unremarked.  8  Th is lacuna is symptom-
atic of the reluctance of historians of international relations to stray beyond 
their traditional focus on war-making and diplomacy.  9  In fact, the inner history 
of the 1863 conference provides a window on the infl uence of international 
relations in one realm that mattered greatly not only to merchants and govern-
ment administrators but also to ordinary people. Postal protocols were highly 
significant not only for the few but also for the many, a group that in this 
period included the millions of European emigrants who had resettled in the 
United States. 
 Th e signifi cance of the 1863 conference extends beyond its infl uence on 
postal policy and international relations. For it also provides a case study of 
the symbiotic relationship of the nation and the international, a relationship 
that was acquiring a heightened salience during the period when the confer-
ence occurred. Spurred by recent innovations in communications and 
transportation—cheap postage, the electric telegraph, the railroad, and the 
steamship—the nation emerged in the 1860s as a “territorialized space.”  10  
Paradoxically, these innovations facilitated expansive international connec-
tions that intensifi ed a preoccupation with the boundaries of the nation. By 
devising protocols for international communications, the delegates to the 
Paris Postal Conference affi  rmed the ubiquity of the spatially bounded nation 
as the fundamental unit in international aff airs. 
 Th e heightened importance of the nation manifested itself in Paris in the 
principled refusal of the Paris delegates to devise protocols to facilitate postal 
surveillance. Postal surveillance remained a national prerogative; postal con-
veyance, in contrast, was increasingly envisioned as a distinctively new kind 
of international domain. Th e distinction between surveillance and convey-
ance was manifest in the detailed transcript of the conference’s proceedings: 
the  form in which the mail was conveyed was regulated, but not the  content 
of the mail itself. To maintain the distinction between form and content, 
the delegates refused to debate the propriety of a national postal monopoly, 
well aware that the monopoly question was closely related to the sensitive 
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issue of the kinds of materials that could, and could not, be admitted into 
the mail. No international body, as a Spanish delegate put it, had the authority 
to block a national postal administration from barring the circulation in 
the mail of any publication that might be inconsistent with “public order or 
the interests of the nation.”  11  
 Th e heightened emphasis on the international dimension of postal con-
veyance posed a particular dilemma for the United States. Th e United States 
was at war in 1863, and the U.S. navy had since 1861 enforced a blockade 
that severely restricted the circulation of information between the Confederacy 
and the wider world. This cordon sanitaire was not absolute. Confederate 
diplomats, for example, could sometimes travel across the Atlantic on neutral 
carriers, a concession that had emerged from a potentially explosive diplo-
matic confrontation involving a British mail packet, the “Trent.”  12  Yet it did 
embrace the mail. Had the Paris delegates truly envisioned a transnational 
informational environment, questions might have arisen about the U.S. navy’s 
informational blockade. Yet none did. For over two weeks, delegates from 
fi ft een countries discussed international postal policy without anyone so 
much as once alluding to the fact that the United States was at war. Th e silence 
was deafening. By showing the fl ag, Kasson used an international forum both 
to export to the wider world a distinctively American vision of postal policy 
and to promote a resolutely nationalistic political agenda. 
 t he  t ransatlantic  c ontext 
 While the primary impetus for the Paris Postal Conference lay in the United 
States, its prehistory originated in Europe, and in particular, in France, Britain, 
and Bremen. 
 French postal policy posed, for Kasson, a particular challenge. To help 
cover the cost of mail delivery inside France without reducing the revenue 
that the French post offi  ce generated for the French treasury, French postal 
administrators charged extremely high rates, known as “transit fees,” on mail 
that  originated outside France, and whose intended  destination was outside 
France, but that passed  through France en route to its recipient. Transit fees 
bore no relationship to the actual cost of transportation. Th at is, it cost much 
more to send a letter in a sealed mailbag  across France from, say, the United 
States to Italy than to deliver a letter  within France from Lille to Marseilles. 
Since France was a large country that was located in the middle of one of the 
world’s most economically advanced regions, the French post offi  ce generated 
a large surplus from its transit fees, which it used to keep postal rates within 
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France low. French government administrators defended this cross-subsidy 
tenaciously as a laudable wealth transfer from the rich to the poor, and by 
the 1860s had enshrined it as a pillar of French postal policy. 
 For Kasson, France’s postal policy seemed hopelessly parochial not only 
because it was so obviously nation-centric, but also because it was predicated 
on a fi scal rationale for postal policy that American lawmakers had long 
rejected. The primary rationale for U.S. postal policy in 1863 was civic: to 
increase popular access to information on market trends, public aff airs, and 
even personal matters, lawmakers permitted the U.S. Post Offi  ce Department 
to run a heft y annual defi cit. In France, in contrast, as in much of the world, 
including Great Britain, the post offi  ce remained an important source of tax 
revenue. 
 While French postal policy held few charms for Kasson, British postal 
policy had more to recommend it. In 1840, Britain became the fi rst country to 
lower dramatically its inland letter-postage rate to increase revenue, forestall 
private-sector rivals in the letter-delivery market, and expand popular access 
to the facilities for long-distance communication. “Penny postage,” as this 
innovation was known, emboldened postal enthusiasts in the United States to 
lobby for a similar reform. Th e comparable reform in the United States, which 
was enacted in 1845 and 1851, would be popularly known as “cheap postage” 
rather than “penny postage.”  13  Kasson fervently supported low and uniform 
postal rates and admired Britain’s innovativeness in leading the way. 
 Cheap postage and penny postage are sometimes regarded as more or 
less synonymous; in fact, they had quite different rationales. The primary 
rationale for penny postage in Great Britain was commercial. By lowering the 
basic letter rate in 1840, British postal administrators tried to match price 
to cost. In so doing, they shift ed the rationale for British postal policy from 
revenue generation to commercial expansion. A lower rate, or so its proponents 
contended, would increase mail volume so substantially that it would facilitate 
trade. For this reason, the rationale for British inland postal policy in the 
period aft er 1840 is best characterized not as  fi scal but as  commercial . 
 Th e rationale for Britain’s overseas postal policy, in contrast, like France’s, 
remained  fi scal : How much revenue could the postage on international mail 
generate for the state? In theory, the fi scal rationale for British overseas postal 
policy could be hard to justify. In explaining how postal rates for interna-
tional mail ought to be computed, for example, the British delegate to the 
Paris Postal Conference, Frederic Hill, found himself trapped in a verbal 
tangle. Th e rates for “transit” and overseas conveyance, Hill explained, as well 
as “all other” postal charges, should be “as moderate as is consistent with the 
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service being self-supporting and yielding a fair profi t.”  14  Yet in practice, high 
transit fees remained a cornerstone of British postal policy. 
 In the United States, in contrast, the primary rationale for the “cheap postage” 
letter-rate reductions in 1845 and 1851 was neither  fi scal nor  commercial but 
 civic . Contemporaries praised cheap postage not only, or even primarily, 
because it matched price with cost, the major rationale for postal rate reduc-
tions in Great Britain. Rather, they hailed rate reductions for facilitating the 
circulation of information useful for public aff airs, market trends, and personal 
matters. Initially, the civic rationale for the low-cost circulation of information 
was confi ned to information on public aff airs, a mandate dating back to the 
Post Offi  ce Act of 1792. In 1825, an administrative ruling briefl y expanded this 
mandate to embrace information on market trends; following the Post Offi  ce 
Act of 1845, lawmakers extended it once again to information on personal 
matters, such as the health of a family member or the birth of a child.  15  
 A second feature of British postal policy to make a deep impression on 
Kasson was the British government’s vigorous promotion of its merchant 
marine. To project its power overseas, the British government invested massively 
in what we might today call “communications infrastructure.” One means to 
this end was the establishment of a fl eet of sailing ships—the post offi  ce packets—
to carry the mail. Another was the awarding of generous government subsidies 
to the Cunard Company, a subsidy that hastened the emergence of the Cunarders’ 
oceangoing steamships as the dominant carrier of transatlantic mail. 
 Th e Cunarders carried the bulk of the overseas mail between Britain and 
America. Yet it was neither Britain, nor France, but the thriving city-state of 
Bremen, that established the fi rst transatlantic bilateral postal convention with 
the United States. Bremen merchants were eager to expand U.S. trade, and 
German immigrants were fl ooding into the United States, giving Bremen a 
prominence in the Atlantic world that is oft en overlooked.  16  
 Th e U.S.-Bremen postal convention was adopted in the summer of 1847. 
It facilitated the conveyance of the mail not only between the United States 
and Bremen, but also between the United States, Bremen, and the rest of 
Europe.  17  Th e catalyst for this agreement was the fi rst sailing of the steamship 
 Washington from New York City to Bremen earlier that year. 
 Steam-powered vessels were nothing new. In fact, steamboats had for 
several decades operated on rivers and coastal waterways. Ocean liners, as 
ocean-worthy steam-powered vessels would come to be known, in contrast, 
remained untested, and their construction posed a technical challenge. It was in 
part for this reason that promoters regarded government support as essential. 
Th e  Washington was one of the fi rst two steamships to be subsidized by 
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Congress under an 1845 law that, for the fi rst time, authorized the postmaster 
general to contract with a steamship line to compete with Cunard in the 
Atlantic trade. The steamship contract went to Edward Mills, a shipping-
business neophyte, who underbid two more credible contenders: Edward K. 
Collins and Robert B. Forbes. Collins operated a successful fl eet of Atlantic 
sailing packets; Forbes owned a large fl eet of ships active in the China trade. 
 Mills promised more for less and he got the contract. Unfortunately for 
the Post Offi  ce Department, he proved unable to raise even a fraction of the 
capital that his contract obliged him to secure, and transferred his rights 
almost immediately to the Ocean Steam Navigation Company, a German-
American joint venture with substantial financial backing from several 
German states and a wealthy group of Bremen merchants.  18  Th e Ocean Steam 
Navigation Company was the fi rst steamship company to have obtained from 
the U.S. government a subsidy large enough to enable it to operate a regularly 
scheduled transatlantic service. Even so, it remained mostly a German aff air. 
In recognition of its German backing, its principal European destination was 
neither Liverpool nor Southampton, but Bremerhaven, Bremen’s North Sea 
port. 
 Each of the two ships that the Ocean Steam Navigation Company built, 
the  Washington and the  Hermann, were constructed by Westervelt & MacKay 
in New York City, the same shipyard responsible for some of the country’s 
most celebrated clipper ships. Th ese steamships proved to be a disappoint-
ment to the Post Offi  ce Department. Not only did they cost more than Mills 
had estimated, but their sailing times failed to outpace the Cunarders. Th e 
company stumbled along until 1857, when the North German Lloyd Company, 
founded in that year, took over its assets and made it part of its fl eet. Its brief 
history, however, cast a shadow on U.S. postal policy that would inform 
positions that Kasson adopted in Paris in 1863. 
 Th e existence of the Ocean Steam Navigation Company helped provide 
the U.S. minister to Great Britain, George Bancroft , with the necessary leverage 
to negotiate in 1848 the fi rst bilateral postal convention between the United 
States and Great Britain. This agreement was less favorable to the United 
States than the Bremen postal convention. Yet it was even more consequential, 
since Great Britain was a far more important trading partner. Had the U.S. 
government not backed its own steamship line, Bancroft might well have 
lacked the clout to obtain the concessions that he did.  19  The crux of the 
problem lay in the strikingly diff erent rationales for mail delivery in the two 
countries. Th e British government regarded international postage as a tax, 
rather than a fee-for-service payment; as a consequence, government 
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administrators expected postal patrons to pay British overseas postal rates 
even if the United States government subsidized its conveyance.  20  Had the 
United States lacked a credible steamship company, Bancroft  might well 
have found himself obliged to accede to the British demands. Yet the United 
States did have a rival in the Ocean Steam Navigation Company and thus a 
modicum of leverage. Bancroft  underscored the distinctively American civic 
rationale for postal policy in arguing for a rate reduction. Newcomers from 
Ireland and continental Europe were flooding the United States and in 
Bancroft’s view the U.S. government had an obligation to enable them to 
communicate with family and friends across the ocean. Bancroft ’s “sole motive” 
in negotiating a postal treaty, as he declared in a public letter that he issued 
shortly before the treaty was ratifi ed, was to promote the “comfort and interest 
of the commercial world”—independent of the potential fi scal consequences 
of the rate reduction for the United States treasury.  21  
 Foreigners agreed. Th e high rates that governments charged on interna-
tional mail troubled cosmopolitan-minded public fi gures in many countries 
and led to the formation in Great Britain of the International Postage Associ-
ation in 1851. Th e International Postage Association received a major impetus 
from the Crystal Palace Exhibition, a landmark international trade fair that 
highlighted the achievements of British commerce and industry. Backers 
included the English banker Lord Ashburton, the Scottish geologist Sir Roderick 
Marchison, the French mathematician and economist Baron Charles Dupin, 
and the Prussian statistician Georg von Viebahn.  22  
 Had circumstances been diff erent, the organizers of the International 
Postage Association might have spearheaded a movement to convene an 
international meeting of postal administrators that would have predated 
the Paris Postal Conference of 1863. Yet its membership soon divided on 
several issues that blocked it from being an eff ective voice for change. For 
certain British postal reformers, it remained unclear if their goal was a 
global reduction in postal rates or merely a reduction in postal rates between 
Great Britain and its colonies.  23  A further constraint was the assumption of 
postal reformers not only in Great Britain but also in France, that international 
postal rates should be high enough to generate a substantial surplus for the 
national treasury. Th e ubiquity of this presumption outside the United States, 
or so concluded an assembly of British notables convened by Lord Ashburton 
during the Crystal Palace Exhibition, helped to explain why the United States 
should take the lead in lobbying for a “system of cheap ocean-postage”: the 
U.S. government, unlike the governments of Great Britain and France, did 
not regard postage as a form of taxation.  24  
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 Th e benefi cial consequences for postal patrons of the American civic 
rationale for postal policy were well known to statesman not only in Britain 
but also in the United States. “Our security for the preservation of our popular 
institutions”—declared the textile manufacturer-turned-U.S. minister to Great 
Britain Abbott Lawrence in 1852, in a letter to the U.S. secretary of state Daniel 
Webster—“rests upon the enlightenment of the people and the extension of 
knowledge.” And to hasten this “enlightenment,” cheap postage held a key: 
“Perhaps nothing does more to diff use that knowledge than the constant 
correspondence which takes place among the people of the United States; and 
were it extended to these islands [Great Britain], a corresponding advantage 
would be gained.”  25  An analogous conviction would help inspire Kasson’s 
mission to Paris. 
 t oward the  p aris  p ostal  c onference 
 Th e civic rationale for American postal policy was but one of several factors 
that helped explain the willingness of the United States to take the lead in 
1863. Another was military exigency. President Abraham Lincoln and his top 
advisors were understandably concerned that the British or French govern-
ment might encourage the construction of Confederate naval vessels in their 
shipyards.  26  A catalyst was the diplomatic fi restorm that followed the capture 
at sea in November 1861 by a U.S. naval offi  cer acting on his own authority of 
two Confederate diplomats on the British mail packet, the “Trent.” Th e diplo-
mats were at the time en route, respectively, to assignments in London and 
Paris. By taking the lead in the organizing an international conference on a 
topic that was seemingly distinct from the confl ict raging at home, the Lincoln 
administration subtly signaled to the world that it remained the only legitimate 
power even in those sections of its territory that in 1863 were not under its 
direct control. 
 Th e stranglehold of the United States over the North Atlantic sea-lanes 
exasperated the many British and French merchants with long-standing 
commercial ties to merchants in seaports under Confederate control. From 
their point of view, Kasson’s endorsement of international standards to 
facilitate the circulation of information across national borders rang hollow. 
Much more immediate was the commercial warfare that the U.S. navy was 
waging to block the circulation of money and information between the 
Confederacy and Europe. Countless letters were lost when U.S. navy vessels 
sank Confederate blockade runners, while many others remained marooned 
in the dead-letter offi  ces in New York City and Washington, D.C., since the U.S. 
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Post Offi  ce refused to deliver them to the South.  27  Many contained large remit-
tances that could not be redeemed, a major impediment to commerce. In 
New Orleans alone, according to France’s foreign minister to the United States, 
between $6 and $8 million in remittances had been held back and awaited 
safe passage to Europe.  28  
 Th e ostensible justifi cation for U.S. leadership in convening the postal 
conference was fi scal. Like the British postal reformer Rowland Hill, Kasson 
intuitively grasped the elemental fact that, if he wished to rally support for 
postal reform, it was expedient to contend that it would improve the govern-
ment’s balance sheet. To settle accounts with European postal administra-
tions, the United States government shipped a considerable quantity of gold 
overseas. In 1863, the U.S. Post Offi  ce Department was running a defi cit of $7 
million, much of which went to Europe to balance accounts.  29  International 
postal reform could help staunch the outfl ow of gold. 
 While the initial justification for this conference had been fiscal, its 
urgency grew out of a much wider range of issues that were unrelated to 
postal accounting. Since the Crystal Palace Exhibit in 1851, the volume of 
international mail had expanded dramatically. As a result, postal adminis-
trators found it increasingly diffi  cult to avoid expensive mistakes in rating 
letters and routing the mail. Th e mounting challenge caused by the rapid 
increase in mail volume obliged postal administrators to pay more atten-
tion to transborder issues. Earlier initiatives, such as the campaign by the 
International Postage Association’s secretary Don Manuel de Ysasi to orga-
nize an international postal conference in Paris in 1855, had failed due to 
widespread indiff erence. Th e association badly needed an infusion of new 
blood, reported one bemused observer in 1852, since it defied reason to 
assume that it could forever be sustained, as it was as present, by the “clique” 
that had organized the 1851 Crystal Palace Exhibition: “Until they get a large 
admixture of non-Exhibition members, their meetings will always bear that 
informal colloquial character which characterizes a reunion of old soldiers, 
which of itself renders them unsuited to newspaper report, and deprives 
them of the pomp and dignity which surround a meeting of the Commis-
sioners of Sewers.”  30  
 No prominent postal administrator played a role in organizing the Inter-
national Postage Association. As a consequence, it was unsurprising that, 
following Ysasi’s unexpected death on the eve of the 1855 Paris meeting—
Ysasi had been a passenger on the ill-fated U.S. government-subsidized mail 
steamer, the  S.S. Arctic , which sank in the North Atlantic—the group disbanded.  31  
By 1862, in contrast, most postal administrators in the countries that sat 
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astride the Atlantic sea-lanes had realized that something had to be done. 
Ironically, the promulgation of international postal protocols would be the 
work of nationally based postal administrators. Over half of the fi ft een del-
egations in attendance at the Paris conference—including those from the 
United States, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Switzerland, Belgium, Italy, and 
the Netherlands—were headed up by postal administrators, or, in the case 
of the United States, a former postal administrator, since Kasson had recently 
won election to Congress. Th e others were headed up by diplomats, with the 
exception of the delegation from the Sandwich Islands (Hawaii), which was 
represented by the peripatetic British political economist John Bowring. 
 A fi nal impetus for the 1863 conference lay in the elusive realm of ideals. 
Th e “cheap postage” movement in the United States and the “penny postage” 
movement in Great Britain had popularized the notion that low and uniform 
postage promoted the public good. Kasson was determined to show how the 
benefi ts of postal reform could be realized not only in one country, but also 
across national boundaries. To this end, Kasson hoped to establish an inter-
national consensus to lower international postal rates, increase their unifor-
mity, and simplify transnational postal accounting.  32  Like Elihu Burritt, the 
stalwart American-born proponent of “ocean penny postage,” Kasson was 
inspired by the idealism of the many merchants, ministers, and peace activists 
who had become persuaded of the nineteenth-century variant of the digital-age 
mantra that “information wants to be free.”  33  
 d evising  i nternational  s tandards 
 In his quest to eliminate the barriers impeding the international circulation 
of information, Kasson oft en found himself allied with the delegates from 
Italy, Switzerland, and Prussia, and in opposition to the delegates from Great 
Britain and France. Th ough the British and French diff ered on many points, 
they shared a propensity, which Kasson found exasperating, to subordinate 
the collective good to parochial concerns. Th e delegates from both countries, 
Kasson fumed in the remarkably candid personal journal that he kept 
during the conference, displayed a “pertinacious disposition” to challenge 
the application of “every acknowledged postal principle” that confl icted with 
their country’s “fi nancial interests” or where the “preponderance of benefi t” 
from the universal adoption of this principle would favor a “foreign nation.”  34  
Both defended high transit fees; the British also hoped to retain high postage 
rates on overseas mail transported in British steamships. “Self-interest,” Kasson 
confi ded in his journal, “stands evidently at both the gates of Europe.”  35  
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 Th e French found the retention of high transit fees so fi scally important 
that Kasson conceded that it might well be necessary to make “some allowance” 
for the “warmth of her delegates upon this point.”  36  In Kasson’s view, transit 
fees should never exceed the postage charged for transporting “domestic” mail, 
eliminating the principle, which was particularly important in France, that 
the revenue generated by transit fees subsidize cheap postage inside the 
country.  37  Yet when the issue of transit fees came up for discussion, the French 
delegate, Édouard Vandal, who also chaired the conference, left the room, 
informing his colleagues that his superiors had prohibited him from so 
much as participating in the discussion of such a sensitive topic.  38  
 Th e obstreperousness of the British delegate, Frederic Hill, was, in certain 
respects, even more unsettling. Early on in the conference, Hill privately told 
Kasson that he wanted Britain and the United States to have “as much con-
currence in our action as possible.”  39  On the face of it, this seemed like a good 
plan. Th e “penny postage” scheme that Great Britain had enacted in 1840 was 
well known around the world, a particular point of pride for Hill, not only 
because Hill himself was a British postal administrator but also because its 
prime mover, Rowland Hill, was Hill’s brother. Even so, Frederic Hill displayed 
what Kasson regarded as an infuriating solicitude for retaining high transit 
fees for mail transported overland inside Great Britain as well as overseas 
by the Cunarders. Government steamship subsidies, in Kasson’s view, had been 
instituted “more in the interest of commerce” than the mail, and thus should 
not be paid for by postal patrons.  40  
 Th e retention of onerous transit fees for steamship service troubled Kasson 
not only because they were unrelated to the actual cost of transporting the 
mail, but also because they varied from steamship company to steamship 
company, complicating the task of establishing a uniform rate. Th e high cost 
and complexity of transatlantic postage had bedeviled American postal patrons 
for many years. Kasson was determined to exert whatever leverage he could 
to establish an international consensus that would facilitate the negotiation of 
bilateral treaties that would lower rates and ensure their uniformity. No issue 
was of more pressing concern to the American merchants with whom Kasson 
had met in Paris before the conference, or the journalists who followed its 
proceedings in the United States.  41  Th e delegates should not get bogged down 
in the “fog of European differences,” complained one Philadelphia editor, 
when the “main object” was establishing low and uniform transatlantic rates: 
“Th ey may make what arrangements they deem fi t as to the crossing of national 
boundaries in Europe, but we have great interest in establishing a better system 
of communication with them in general.”  42  
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 Kasson’s frustration with Hill was exacerbated by his weak bargaining 
position. Th e British government in 1863 subsidized the mighty Cunaders; 
the U.S. government, in contrast, had by then left  the subsidy business altogether. 
Th e diff erential investment of the British and the Americans in oceangoing 
mail steamships greatly troubled Kasson, since he regarded steamship sub-
sidies not only as a bargaining chip but also as a catalyst for economic develop-
ment. It was his “earnest opinion,” or so Kasson informed New Zealand postal 
administrator Crosbie Ward, that the subsidization of a line of “mail and 
commercial” steamships on the Pacifi c Ocean was indispensable to the future 
commercial expansion of the United States. “I believe,” Kasson elaborated, 
that a “connected system of such communication” from San Francisco, via 
the Sandwich Islands, to Japan and China, and from Panama southward to 
Australia and New Zealand was a “necessity” that the United States must 
“soon appreciate” as “alone capable of making our country the fi nancial and 
commercial centre of the world.”  43  
 Th e high expectations with which Kasson had invested cheap postage 
helps to explain his exasperation at Frederic Hill’s ultimately unsuccessful 
attempt to back down from the radical proposal that Hill himself had made 
to limit transit rates to one half the “interior” rates on the same route, a proposal 
that had been approved by a subcommittee on which both Hill and Kasson 
served.  44  Th ough Hill publicly supported a “liberal” agenda, Kasson recog-
nized that Hill retained many misgivings about the “more liberal resolutions” 
to which the delegates had agreed, and predicted that, as the head of the 
foreign desk at the British post offi  ce—which, among other things, put him in 
charge of steamship policy—Hill would oppose them if they confl icted with 
“English usage.” Indeed, Kasson feared that this criticism might “even apply 
to his [Hill’s] connection with the transit resolution, which was his own 
proposition.”  45  
 For Kasson, the transit fee issue was intimately connected to other, less 
contentious matters. Prominent among them was the establishment of an 
international standard for the weight of a single letter; the articulation 
of uniform accounting protocols for mail that crossed multiple national 
boundaries; and the adoption in the United States of the metric system, a 
reform that Kasson hoped the postal conference would promote. Yet the 
transit issue remained key. Th e best way to ensure that one nation would not 
beggar its neighbor by insisting on outrageously high transit fees, in Kasson’s 
view, was to peg transit fees to domestic postal rates. If this principle were 
adopted, then postal patrons in foreign countries would obtain a “certain 
kind of protection” from extortionate charges since they would have the 
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benefi t of “whatever responsibility existed” with regard to the “like charges” 
that the government assessed on “its own subjects or citizens.”  46  
 Kasson’s linkage of transit fees with domestic postal rates illustrated the 
interdependence of international postal standard-setting bodies and national 
postal administrations. To increase popular access to the mail, national govern-
ments lowered their internal postal rates. Having done so, and unless they 
wished to countermand the protocols agreed upon in Paris, they had no 
choice but to peg domestic postal rates to the transit fees that they charged on 
mail that traveled through their territory en route to its fi nal destination. 
 The linkage Kasson envisioned between domestic and international 
postal rates would take over a decade to institutionalize. In the meantime, 
U.S. postal administrators found themselves at the mercy of Great Britain and 
France. To solve this problem, Kasson worked with the Belgian and Prussian 
delegates to reroute the large volume of mail currently being sent to and from 
the multitudes of Germans and Scandinavians who had emigrated to the 
United States. If postal administrators in Europe sent the “social correspon-
dence” of the Germans and the Scandinavians on the Bremen- and Hamburg-
based mail Atlantic steamers, rather than on the Cunarders, it would 
signifi cantly lower its cost, since the German steamship lines charged a mere 
10 cents per letter, far less than Cunard. True, the mail would cross the Atlantic 
more slowly on a German steamer. For this reason, time-sensitive merchants 
were likely to stick with the faster, more expensive Cunarders. For the vast 
majority of postal patrons, however, speed was of “much less importance” 
than the cost of conveyance.  47  
 Kasson’s expansive interpretation of the civic rationale for postal com-
munications won him the plaudits of several conference delegates. In contrast 
to the postal systems of the “great majority of countries,” or so the Swiss 
delegate admiringly observed, the U.S. postal system was not expected to gen-
erate a surplus for its government. As a consequence, as the French delegate 
Édouard Vandal perceptively declared, its policy was “exceptional.” Limiting 
the transit rate to one-half the inland rate was an “immense step forward”; 
even so, Vandal reassured his French colleagues, the lower transit rate was 
still high enough to ensure the French treasury a “handsome profi t.”  48  
 While the 1863 conference did not resolve all of the issues troubling 
Kasson, it proved remarkably successful at establishing protocols that, in the 
next few years, would be institutionalized in bilateral postal treaties between 
most of the world’s most commercially advanced nations. All in all, the dele-
gates agreed to thirty-one “rules,” as the protocols were termed in the English-
language transcription of the conference proceedings that the U.S. postmaster 
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general printed in his 1864 annual report. Th ese protocols divided the mail 
into six “classes,” established uniform procedures for postal accounting, des-
ignated a common standard of measurement (the “metrical decimal system”), 
and specifi ed a maximum weight for a single international letter (15 grams). 
Conveniently for Great Britain and the United States, which remained on the 
rival avoirdupois (16 ounces to a pound) measurement system, this weight 
maximum was basically identical to one-half an ounce, minimizing any poten-
tial disruption. 
 Among Kasson’s greatest achievements was the inclusion in the confer-
ence proceedings of a strongly worded clause that derided high transit fees 
as an “insurmountable obstacle” to establishing an “international system of 
correspondence” on conditions “advantageous to the public.” Henceforth, the 
delegates agreed, transit fees on foreign letters should “never” exceed one-half 
the rate of that on inland postage.  49  Kasson’s achievement was all the more 
impressive given the fact that the United States had no fl eet of government-
subsidized steamships to use as a bargaining chip: ideas rather than interests 
carried the day. 
 To reduce Kasson’s achievement to a mere list of proposals, however, 
obscures their true character. In international postal negotiations, the United 
States enjoyed the moral high ground by virtue of the expansiveness of its 
civic rationale for postal policy. The distinctiveness of this rationale was 
obvious to every well-informed student of postal aff airs. Yet it was Kasson 
who transformed it into protocols that would eventually be embraced by an 
international standard-setting body. “Let us not forget, gentlemen,” Kasson 
declared, in a brief speech that he delivered on the fi nal day of the conference, 
“the extent of the interests involved in some degree in our enterprise”:
 Th e mails carry those orders, which create foreign commerce, sus-
tain the commercial marine, and aid largely in the development of 
interior industry. Th ey exchange the missives which are so necessary 
to the interests of family, of kindred and of friendship, and upon 
which so much of the happiness of our race depends. Th ey diff use 
the printed elements of civilization, progress, and intelligence. In each 
of these ways, they serve to break down the useless barriers which 
ignorance and non-intercourse formerly interposed between nations. 
Th ey are the initiators of a durable condition of international peace 
and prosperity. To facilitate these great results, while at the same 
time we promote the immediate convenience of the public—this has 
been our mission.  50  
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 By internationalizing the civic rationale for U.S. postal policy, Kasson gave 
the Paris conference a mandate that was far more ambitious than the sum 
of its parts. 
 Th e biggest disappointment of the conference for Kasson, as well as his 
colleagues in the like-minded Italian and Swiss delegations, was the failure 
to eliminate route-based rate differentials, an outcome that was probably 
due to backroom maneuvering by Frederic Hill. Even here, however, the 
delegates took a major step toward their elimination, by stipulating that, 
whenever “intermediate charges” rendered it “practicable,” the rates on 
international correspondence should be uniform, independent of the routes 
over which the mail might be conveyed.  51  In the years to come, the protocols 
Kasson helped devise in Paris would become institutionalized in postal 
policy, first in bilateral treaties, and eventually in multilateral accords. 
 a  l iberal  t radition 
 Th e Paris Postal Conference received respectful, if oft en cursory, attention 
in the British and American press. Its delegates seem to have arrived at a 
“good understanding of the principles of postal reciprocity,” declared one 
British postal administrator in 1864, and “good will doubtless be the result.” 
Th e “Postal Congress” was a “Peace Congress” of the “most effi  cient kind,” the 
administrator added, “and in every sense of the term.”  52  Th e American press 
emphasized Kasson’s “liberal” vision of international communications, a 
characterization that Kasson himself embraced.  53  Particularly admirable, in 
the opinion of the Washington, D.C.–based  National Intelligencer , had been 
Kasson’s determination to follow up the achievements of the conference with 
the negotiation of bilateral postal treaties with several countries, including 
Belgium, Italy, and Switzerland. In so doing, he had given “practical eff ect” 
to the “liberal movements initiated at the International Conference.”  54  
 Th e civic rationale for American postal policy that Kasson invoked in 1863 
had been for several decades a subject of frequent discussion by the small yet 
dedicated cadre of American journalists who had made a special study of 
postal policy. Foremost among them was Joshua Leavitt, a Congregationalist-
minister-turned-newspaper editor who had long written on postal topics for 
the  Independent , an infl uential religious newspaper based in New York City. 
Leavitt had followed postal aff airs closely since the 1840s, when he had lob-
bied lawmakers to emulate Rowland Hill’s experiment with penny postage. 
Frustrated by the refusal of Congress in 1845 to reduce the basic inland letter 
rate to 1 cent—the basic inland letter rate would be reduced to 5 and 10 cents 
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in 1845, depending on distance, and to a fl at 3 cents for most of the United 
States in 1851—Leavitt repeatedly lectured the public on the distinctiveness 
of the U.S. government’s civic mandate to circulate information over long 
distances at low cost. Th e “language of the Constitution,” Leavitt pontifi cated 
in 1862, enshrined the presumption that information—and, in particular, the 
information contained in newspapers—should be circulated at the lowest 
practicable rates. In this way, it helped ensure that the postal system would 
remain a “great enginery of governmental wisdom and benefi cence” conducted 
for the “public good” to promote the “widest diff usion of intelligence.”  55  
 Leavitt had no doubt that “intelligence” embraced not only newspapers, 
but also personal correspondence, which, by an analogous logic, should also 
be circulated at the lowest possible rate. Should Congress reduce the inland 
letter rate to 1 cent, Leavitt predicted, this would massively increase the circu-
lation of inland letters through the postal system, enabling the United States 
to equal Great Britain in mail volume, a benchmark that Leavitt regarded as 
proof that the republican United States could match its monarchical parent.  56  
Th e post offi  ce, Leavitt declared in an essay on Anglo-American commercial 
solidarity that he successfully entered in 1868 in a prize competition admin-
istered by free-trade–oriented English Cobden Club, was “beyond a question, 
the most perfect piece of governmental machinery that was ever invented,” 
and the establishment of cheap ocean postage between Britain and America 
would be likely, if “continued for a generation,” to “render a bloody war between 
the two nations unimaginable.”  57  
 Yet even committed postal visionaries such as Leavitt were long reluctant 
to wholeheartedly endorse cheap ocean postage. In this regard, as in his quixotic 
endorsement of the metric system, Kasson’s position was unusually advanced. 
Unlike the stalwart cheap-postage champion Elihu Burritt, Leavitt would not 
editorialize in favor of cheap ocean postage in the  Independent until aft er the 
inauguration of Ulysses S. Grant in March 1869. And unlike Kasson, Leavitt 
would remain far more committed to lowering domestic postal rates than to 
lowering the transit fees on mail sent from country to country. 
 l egacies 
 In the end it would not be a national government, but an international orga-
nization that institutionalized the protocols regulating overseas mail that 
brought cheap postage to the world. Th is organization owed a major debt to 
the linkage by an American postal administrator-turned-lawmaker of national 
prerogatives and international standard-setting. Kasson had not intended the 
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1863 Paris Postal Conference to lead directly to an international postal orga-
nization, and it did not. Th e “idea” of the United States in calling for the meeting, 
or so Kasson explained in a public statement that he gave during its opening 
day, was not to “bind” the countries who had sent delegates, but, rather, “simply 
to examine a certain number of questions, whose solution would facilitate the 
negotiation of postal treaties.”  58  It would take eleven years before delegates 
met in Berne, Switzerland, to establish the General Postal Union (GPU), the 
international standard-setting body that, following its transmogrifi cation 
into the Universal Postal Union (1878), would fi nally establish the binding inter-
national postal protocols that have rendered bilateral postal treaties obsolete.  59  
 Th e 1863 Paris Postal Conference was but one of a series of events that 
led to the founding of the UPU, and with it, international standards for circu-
lating letters, newspapers, and, eventually, parcels. Yet it is worth remem-
bering for at least two reasons that had nothing to do with UPU genealogy. 
Most obviously, it thrust the United States onto the world stage at an unusually 
precarious moment in its history. In the summer of 1863, the future of the 
republic remained to be decided on the battlefi eld and the possibility that 
one or more European powers might establish diplomatic relations with the 
Confederacy could not be discounted. Th ough there is remarkably little direct 
evidence linking Kasson with the Lincoln administration’s diplomatic 
strategy, he could not have been unaware of the extent to which the very 
fact that the U.S. government had convened an international meeting in the 
heart of Europe in the midst of a devastating civil war reminded the great 
powers that the United States was a player on the world stage and that the 
Confederacy was not. 
 Th e power that the United States projected at the postal conference had 
little to do with its commercial prowess. Th e U.S. government in 1863 no 
longer commanded its own fl eet of mail steamers, as, for example, it had in 
1848: U.S.-backed transatlantic mail steamship service had been suspended 
during the war. It was, similarly, unrelated to its military muscle. Th e United 
States was so weak militarily that the Lincoln administration found it impos-
sible to retain two Confederate diplomats whom a U.S. naval commander, 
acting on his own authority, had captured on a British mail steamship in 
international waters. Th ough the Confederate diplomats had been trying to 
obtain British and French recognition for the Confederacy, the Lincoln 
administration found itself stymied not only by hostile international public 
opinion, but also by the very real possibility that, had it refused to give the 
Confederate diplomats up, it might well have provoked war with Great Britain, 
then the leading naval power in the world. 
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 Th e power that the United States projected, rather, lay in the realm of ideas, 
or what a present-day political theorist might call “soft  power.” Th e primary 
rationale for the 1863 Paris Postal Conference, Kasson declared, in his closing 
remarks, had been to remove “obstacles to uniformity, simplicity, and cheapness 
in international postal intercourse,” and, to an extent that was greater than 
their “fears” had permitted them to anticipate, its delegates had draft ed protocols 
for international postal arrangements that had done much to “remove them.”  60  
 Th e capacious civic rationale for postal policy that Kasson championed 
in his address to his fellow delegates distinguished the United States from the 
Confederacy, whose Constitution specifi cally forbade postal subsidies and 
mandated that all postal expenses be paid for out of general revenue.  61  In 
addition, it identifi ed the United States with a mission more elevated than 
self-preservation, less controversial than popular self-government, and more 
plausible than abolition. By advocating the establishment of international 
postal protocols, Kasson projected outward a compelling civic ideal. Just as 
the American West ought to be free from slavery, as Kasson had posited in 
the 1860 Republican Party platform; so, too, international communications 
should be liberated from the parochialism of nation-centric postal policies 
that inhibited commerce and mutual understanding. Here, as in so many 
other realms, national prerogatives and international standard-setting went 
hand in hand.  62  
 The legacy of postal policy is easily forgotten. For example, it has for 
some time been a commonplace to trace back the genealogy of present-day 
digital communications networks not to the mail, but instead to the electric 
telegraph. In its baldest formulation, journalists proclaim the electric tele-
graph the “Victorian Internet.”  63  In fact, however, this analogy is fl awed for 
at least two reasons. First, it was the mail, and not the electric telegraph, 
that enabled ordinary people to transmit messages around the world at high 
speeds and on a regular schedule at an extremely low cost. Electric telegraph 
rates remained far too high to be practical for international communications.  64  
Second, the impetus for this innovation lay not in Victorian Great Britain, 
but in the republican United States. 
 “Cheap postage” lacks moral resonance today. Even so, in the Atlantic 
world of 1863 it remained a phrase to conjure with, and helps to explain why, 
at such a seemingly unpropitious moment in its history, the United States 
took the lead in hastening the promulgation of international standards in 
a realm that was seemingly so far removed from the pressing needs of the 
day. Nineteenth-century liberalism diff ered in many ways from its twentieth-
century stepchild. Yet it was no less infused with a fervent faith in the utopian 
 r ichard  r .  j ohn  |  435 
proposition that collective experiments in social engineering could remake the 
world. Politics have artifacts.  65  Like the Atlantic cable—or the mail steamship—
cheap postage was not only or even primarily a technical advance. Rather, 
it was a cultural expression of a compelling civic ideal. 
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